Tuesday, July 22, 2008

Genealogies of rel pt. 2

24-Many 19th ce thinkers saw rel as "an early human condition from which mod law, scinece, and pols emerged and became detached"
-in 20th ce, most have abandoned the evolutionary ideas and challenge idea that rel is simply primitive and outmoded
-4 them it is a distinct aspect of human life

29-"socially idfiable forms, preconditions, and effects of what was regarded as rel in medieval xn times were diff in mod socity
-"what we call" relus power was diffly distributed and had diff thrust, diff ways it shaped and responded to legal institns, diff categories of knowledge it authorized and made available"

-"there cannot b a universal def of rel, not only b/c its constitutent elements and relationships r historically specific, but b/c that def [Geertz's "cultural system"] is itself the historical product of discursive processes"
-critiques Geertz's def (66 and 73-interpt of cultures): "(1) a sys of symbols which act to (2) estab powerful, pervasive, and long-lasting modds and motivations in men by (3) formulating conceptions of a gen order of existence and (4) clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that (5) the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic" (90)
30-"a transhistorical def of rel is not viable"

-Geertz's idea is that a symbol is separate from a conception, sometimes not
31-note #5 says there is a theory (collingwood 38, bk. 2) that says theres not even sucha thing as universal moods associated w/ symbols, so even "the notion of a generalized relus emothion (or mood) may b ?'d"--ie, otto
-says since Vygotsky (78) was "able to show how the dvlpmnt of children's intellect is dpndnt on the internaliztn of social speech" it "means that the formation of what we have here called 'symbols' (complexes, concepts) is conditioned by the social relations in which the growing child is involved--by the social activities that he or she is permitted or incouraged or obliged to undertake--in which other symbols (speech and significant mvmnts) r crucial. the conditions (discursive and nondiscursive) that explain how wymbols come to be constructed and how some of them r established as natural or authoritative as opposed to others, then becomes an important object of anthropological inquiry...the authoritative status of representations/discourses is dependent on the the appropriate production of other representations/discourses; the two r intrinsically and not just temporarily connected"
32-geerz assumes theres a separate culture/social and indv--a parsonian theory
35-geertz's idea that these symbols produce moods and motivations falls short b/c the obvious reason that power has a big impact, citing st. augustinges views after experiences with the donatist heresy--power "created the conditions for experiencing [relus] truth"
37-38-gives a long list of medieval xn rules regulating what was correct faith and practice
39-tho xn rules knew that indvs might interp it diffrntly, they wanted to control what was acceptable as legit

40-says that during the 17th ce, after the wars of rel, was when "the earliest stystematic attempts at producing a universal def of rel were made"-cites willey (34, 114) who writes that lord Herbert's de veritate marked eurpns leaving the old belief that everything nonxn was simply pagan or jew--he tried to understand rel for all men--as xns were encountering so many others b/c the church had fragmented
-herbert's def "later came to b formulated as natural rel"--belief in supreme power, practices, andethics--existed in all societies
41-this def did not include scriptures

42-"nat rel was a crucial step in the formation of the mod concept of relus belief, experience and practce, and that it was an idea dvlpd in response to probs specific to xn theology at a particular historical juncture"
-"by 1795, kant was able to produce a fully essentialized idea of rel" (kant: poll writings 91, 114) and it was diff than its "phenomenal forms"/"confessions"/faiths/denominations

-there4, "the idea that anthros have 2day of rel has a very specific, xn background"
43-"relus theory became necessary for a correct reading of mute ritual hieroglyphics of otherss" to convert them. "it is essential for judging the validity of their cosmological utterances"

46-rel is also not some universal ways of coping w/ chaos of life b/c the chaotic things always change as do ways to cope--eg diff understandings of evil
47-says geertzs insitence that rel have "factuality"--that ppl need a knowledge of it is a mod, privatized xn idea b/c the medieval xn institutions didn't base their power on ldearned knowlege--simply belief
48-and writers have argued that belief does or doesn't exist in practitionners
50-and critiques gerrtzs idea that ritual makes rel b/c geertz doesn't explain how and why 1 ritual and not another is relus

54-"the anthrogical student of particular rels should therefore begin from this pt. [that rel is aproduct of historical forces], in a sense unpacking the comprehensive concept which he or she translates as "rel" into into heterogenous elements according to its hsitorical character"

58-in the mid 17th ce "ritual" entered the oxford engl dictionry, meant the symbolic act AND the book that contained directions--the same def used in the first ed of encyclopedia britannica (1771) and used in there thru the 1850s, entry stopped for a while, then reappeared in 1910 but lost the meaning of book and was synonomous with "rite"
-in 19th ce, ritual was seen as primitive--not necessary like myth (belief)--an idea that "reatly historicizes and secularizes the refrmtn doctrine that correct belief must b more highly valued than correct practice"
-stated explicity in encycl britnca (1910), quoting w. robertson smith who "gave mod anthrogy its first comprehensive theory of ritual" (from steiner 56)

60-the idea that ritual should b interprted has long been around in xnty--anthros took up that idea and said some rels were too "primitive" to interpret them
61-tho some anthros found that some ppl did not interprt rituals

72-another thinker says emotions r intrinsic to lang (harre 86)

78- for medieval xns, ritual was regulated practices of "mental and moral dispositions"--esp for monks
79-but now, b/c discipline is part of mod living, rites now r seen as symbolic

173-gellner's "concepts and society" criticizes anthros for giving meaning to things that might not have that meaning--"excessive charity"
-samuelsson 61 critiqued webers ethic thesis for reinterpreting texts to match thesis--which is functionalism, using social context
180-but to say that u can't understand anything is wrong b/c that would mean no one could even understnd their own culture--no, ud do learn , but a translator does face the prob of misunderstanding of lang and funct

189-there is difficulty in translating b/c ppl have tendency to put the lang in their own lang's terms and not adapt to the differences of the original lang, rarely do original langs change the translator's lang
190-this is the result of power relations, eg thrid world langs rarely changed with w. langs, esp b/c w. langs have control of knowledge
191-eg since 19th ce when w. lang texts started being translated to arabic, arabic adapted w. puct, sentece structures, idiomatic expressions, etx.
-and w. models "should" b learned as "a precondition for the production of more knowledge"
193-another example is that when we translate actions which r preformed, they lose some meaning when written down
194-a social anthros job is to translate culture, but it's difficult b/c sometimes "local" indvs aren't aware of larger meanings
197-but sicne in w. society written records r more respected than folk memories, these translations become instiutitonalized and make these societies appear to fit into a certain mold, capable of being manipulated--and can even get retranslated back and affect how they see themselves

200-"...anthros who seeks to describe rather than to moralize will consider ea trad in its own terms--even as it has come to be reconstituted by mod forces--in order to compare and contrast it with others. more precisely, they will try to understand ways of reasoning characteristic of given trads...beyond that, they should learn to treat some of their own Enlightenmnt assumptions as belonging to specific kinds of reasoning--albeit kinds of reasoning that have largely shaped our mod world--and not--as the ground from which all understanding of non-Enlightenment trads must begin"

201-looks at aspects of enlighenment from Kants essay "an answer to the ?: 'what is Enlightenmnt'" Asad acknowledges that kant is not rep the whole of enlghtenment (Gay 73 showed its diversity) but kant has been "judged to have been historically decisive fro teh trad in making a formative moment in the theoriztn of a central feature of 'civil socity,' the feature concerning the possibilites of open, rtl criticism"
-Jacob 91 living the enlgitnment argues that freemason practiceswere of major importance in the emergence of libertarian and secular ideals--contrary to the conventional view that enlightnment was an intellectual mvmnt--it was social and poll
-foucault 84 used same kant essay, its part that says a mature person is one who relies on reason, not authority--is a foundation for idea of the self in mody

204-kant believed that ppl should obey poll authority but have freedom in criticism btwn other literate ('rtl")ppl, w/out criticizing certain institutions--and rel was "belief," not fact and passion, not reason--so it was ok to restrict relus discussion in public

206-"scholars r now more aware that relus toleration was a poll means to the formation of strong state power that emerged from the sectarian wars of the 16th and 17th ces rather than the gift of benign intention to defend pluralism"
-lipsios (16th ce) said any policy to ensure civil peace is good--if relus diversity could b stopped, good, if not, w/e; locke (17thce) agreed
-this resulted in morality being "theorized separate from the domain of pols"--tho some argued that this meant that this pushed transcendntal secular moralism of poll philosophers into poll practice
207-"liberals continue to invoke [kant's] principle of public use of reason as the arbiter of true knowledge...and remain alert to the disruptive possibilities of rel as defined--for xn as well as non-xn trads--by the Enlgitnmnt"

-"the formation of strong state power in the contemp ME has a very diff genealogy. In most cases, strong states have inheriited colonial forms; a few owe their formation to islmc mvmnts. in such polities, there is no public use of reason in Kant's sense, nor r relus truth and relus criicism typically regarded by their public spokesmen as matters properly confined to the personal domain"
208-but they have their own institutionalized forms of criticisms

209-in w. weritings about ulama resistance to mod goods is shown as irrational-not explicityly but thru w.c. and therefor normalizing w. ways

213-public criticism came (in SA) in the khutbas and theological texts, and the ulama weren't against all mod goods, jsut mediums of discrourse (radios, tvs, etc..) b/c they insitituitonalized relus authority of discourse

232-this shows ther's not an instrinsic contradiction btwn rel and reason

233-many antrhos see "ideology" (re or morality") in pols as a stage in a country's dvlpmnt "from trad to mody" cites Geertz 73
234-this assumes that mod lib pols doesn't have morality, it's simple rtl--bu the idea of civil and human rts "r not merely neutral legal facts, they r profoundly moralistic values constantly invoked to guide and criticize mod pols"
-and thse rts have a specific relus (sn) hsitory (friedrich 64), tho no longer based on relus reason
-but its true that appeals to reason dont' recognize diff "resonsings" see macintyre 88

241-a "british" idy didn't really dvlp til 1880-1920 (Colls and Dodd 86, 21)

212--John Pattern's (brit govt guy responsible for race relations) article encouraging muslims to b more "british" requd things even most "brits" didn't posses--sets up a norm
244-emphasizes "freedom" as a characteristic which includes "tolerance"--acceptance of diversity, rts to believe, speak and act; and "obligations"--2 respect rts
-tho in reality, rts conflict eg property rts (esp intellectual) limit free speech
245-and he is not clear if diversity is simply tolerated as long as it doesn't contradict an essential britishness or if it is intrinsic, that birt is alwasy changing
-emphasizes the indv, fam and community--not groups , as if they have no place in public sphere tho theis is "patently" false--eg bizs, institutions, societies, ideas
-"pattern's formulation must b read as intending to discourage cultural minorities from establishing themselves as corporate poll actors. as far as cultural miinority members r concerned, they must participate in britishness...as indvs"
246-says not to forget cultural roots but also not to have dual loyalties (legal and moral)

250-in order for brit imperial rulers to get subjects to adapt to its institutions, they need to adapt its "culture" to they had to "idfy, study, and normalize the culture of its subject ppls"--giving rise to sociogy and anthrogy (barker 41, 32)

260-the recent brit emphasis on multiculturalism is not an ideolgoical commitment to cultural diversity, but is motivated in an "attempt to deal w/ practical probs encountered in ed and the social services"--and resultant urban unrest

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